Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment by Feerick, John D.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 3 Article 8 
2010 
Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
John D. Feerick 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 
Fordham L. Rev. 907 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol79/iss3/8 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 907 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND INABILITY:  
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 
John D. Feerick* 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 908 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ......................... 909 
II.  PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND INABILITY PRIOR TO THE 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT ........................................................ 911 
A.  The United States Constitution’s Succession Clause ................ 911 
1.  Meaning of “Inability” Under the Succession Clause ........ 911 
2.  Who Is To Judge Whether Inability Exists? ...................... 912 
a.  Vice President or Other Officer upon Whom the 
Presidential Functions Devolve ............................ 913 
b.  Congress ................................................................. 915 
c.  The Judiciary .......................................................... 916 
d.  The Cabinet ............................................................. 917 
B.  History of Presidential Disability Prior to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment .............................................................................. 918 
1.  Madison's Illness ................................................................ 918 
2.  Tyler Precedent .................................................................. 918 
3.  Garfield's Inability .............................................................. 919 
4.  Wilson's Inability ............................................................... 920 
5.  Eisenhower's Inabilities ...................................................... 921 
6.  Kennedy's Assassination .................................................... 922 
III.  THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT ..................................................... 922 
A.  Ratification ............................................................................... 922 
B.  An Analysis of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment ............................ 924 
C.  History Post-Ratification ......................................................... 926 
1.  Reagan's Assassination Attempt ........................................ 926 
2.  Reagan's Cancer Surgery ................................................... 929 
3.  Appointment of Gerald Ford as Vice President ................. 930 
 
*  John Feerick is a Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law, where he served 
as Dean from 1982–2002.  In addition, he is the founder and director of the Feerick Center 
for Social Justice at the Law School.  The author wishes to express his profound gratitude to 
Brandon Gershowitz for all the assistance he provided in the development of this paper, 
assistance that ran the gamut of summarizing past writings, of the author and others, 
examination of constitutional and legal precedents, and drafting sections of this paper under 
the author’s supervision and guidance. 
908 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
4.  Succession of Gerald Ford to the Presidency and 
Appointment of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President ..... 931 
5.  George W. Bush's Invocations ........................................... 931 
D.  An Appraisal ............................................................................. 932 
IV.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCIES ..................... 933 
V.  GAPS IN THE CURRENT SUCCESSION LAW .......................................... 934 
A.  Vice Presidential Disability Followed by Presidential Death .. 935 
B.  Concurrent Vice Presidential and Presidential Disability ....... 935 
C.  Disabled President Followed by Disabled Acting President ... 936 
D.  Vice Presidential Vacancy Scenarios ....................................... 936 
E.  A Response ................................................................................ 936 
VI.  ADDRESSING THESE GAPS:  A VACANT VICE PRESIDENCY OR 
DISABLED OCCUPANT .................................................................... 937 
A.  Contingent Grants of Power ..................................................... 940 
B.  The Ability of Congress To Legislate ........................................ 942 
VII.  BEYOND THE VICE PRESIDENCY:  LEGISLATIVE OFFICERS IN THE 




Each year in the United States, the Constitution is celebrated in a myriad 
of ways.  It richly deserves such veneration for all it has made possible, not 
simply in the United States but throughout the world.  It is the oldest living 
written Constitution of its kind, providing a model for many of the written 
constitutions of the world.  Among its many provisions are several on the 
subject of presidential succession.  These provisions have been applied to 
give the country stability and continuity.  They have evolved over time, 
beginning with the foundational provisions of Article II, Section 1, Clause 
6, added to by the Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments, and 
supplemented by acts of Congress establishing a line of succession beyond 
the Vice Presidency.  To the present moment, the resulting legal structure 
has served the nation well, though imperfectly at times, by anticipating and 
providing for contingencies involving the highest offices of the United 
States. 
The Framers of the Constitution did not spend a great deal of time on the 
succession provisions, but just enough to get the nation started.  The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment answered questions they left open in the area of 
presidential inability and gave further significance to the Vice Presidency, 
which had been adopted almost as an afterthought.  The absence of 
discussions by the Framers in the area of presidential succession is not 
surprising given that it was not until near the end of the Constitutional 
Convention that they settled on the method of selecting the President and 
many of the powers of the Office. 
As strong as the system of presidential succession may appear, 
complacency can easily set in, leading to an unwillingness to confront gaps 
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and defects that reveal themselves along the way.  The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, a memorial to a fallen President, was propelled forward by a 
tragedy that brought into focus the intractable issue of presidential inability 
and the absence of procedures for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, raised modern questions as to 
the adequacy of the provisions for dealing with presidential inability, 
continuity in government, and the Electoral College system. 
Several gaps in the area of presidential inability are triggered by the 
absence of any provisions in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment for dealing with 
the disability of a President when there is either no Vice President or the 
Vice President has himself become disabled.  This was not a drafting 
oversight but rather reflected a judgment by congressional leaders to 
accomplish what they could in the politics of that time.1  This Article 
examines these gaps and offers approaches for dealing with them.  The 
Article also comments on proposals with respect to the line of succession 
beyond the Vice Presidency, a line considered by many scholars to be 
unconstitutional because it includes legislative officers, and for other 
reasons that will be discussed below. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A useful starting point is an overview of the current constitutional and 
statutory provisions on the subject of presidential succession. 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 brought together two proposals made at the 
Constitutional Convention.  The first provided for a successor to the 
President in the event of his death, resignation, removal or inability.2  The 
second gave Congress the power to establish a line of succession.3  Joined, 
 
 1. This subject was very much present in the 1965 House deliberations on the 
Amendment, as evidenced by a letter I sent to Representative Richard Poff at his request, 
stating in part the following: 
  You asked if I could suggest some language which would cover the case of 
simultaneous inability of the President and Vice-President.  As I see it, you have 
basically three situations in mind:  (1) the inability of a Vice-President at a time 
when the President is disabled, (2) the inability of an Acting President, and (3) the 
inability of a President when there is no Vice-President.  If it should be determined 
essential to have provisions covering these cases, I would suggest adding two 
sections to the basic proposal.  These sections might read as follows: 
“6.  The inability of the Vice-President shall be determined in the same manner as 
that of the President except that the Vice-President shall have no right to 
participate in such determination.” 
“7.  In case of the death, resignation, removal or inability of the Vice-President, the 
person next in line of succession shall act in lieu of the Vice-President under 
Sections 4 and 5 with the heads of the Executive Departments or such other body 
as Congress may by law provide.” 
Letter from John D. Feerick to Representative Richard Poff, U.S. House of Representatives 
(Feb. 7, 1965) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).  Representative Poff played a critical 
role in the formulation of the Amendment. 
 2. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 185–86 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 3. Id. at 535. 
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the resulting provision4 created issues for later generations regarding the 
status of a Vice President after a succession event and the kind of “Officer” 
appropriate for the line of succession.5 
The Twelfth Amendment established separate voting for President and 
Vice President, giving the U.S. Senate a role where no candidate for Vice 
President had received a majority of the electoral votes.6  It also provided 
that if an election of President fell to the U.S. House of Representatives, 
with no candidate having a majority of the electoral votes and no candidate 
having been selected by the beginning of the President’s term, the Vice 
President “shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other 
constitutional disability of the President.”7 
Later, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment, providing that the Vice 
President elect shall become President if the President-Elect has died before 
his inauguration, replaced this provision of the Twelfth Amendment.8  It 
further added that if the President has not been chosen, or has failed to 
qualify, by the beginning of the term, the Vice President-Elect shall act as 
President until a President has qualified.9  It went on to state, “Congress 
may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor Vice 
President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as 
President . . . and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice 
President shall have qualified.”10  Further, Section 4 of the Twentieth 
Amendment gave Congress the power to provide for the death of any of the 
persons from whom the House or Senate may choose for President and 
Vice-President, respectively, when the right to do so devolved on them 
under the Twelfth Amendment.11 
Finally, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment clarified the status of a Vice 
President in case of a succession event, provided for cases of inability, and 
established a procedure for filling a vice presidential vacancy.12 
The current federal succession statute provides for a line of succession 
after the Vice President, going first to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, then the President pro tempore of the Senate, followed by 
the individual Cabinet members.13  Other provisions relating to presidential 
succession are found elsewhere in the Constitution, as well as in procedures 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also infra Part III.A. 
 5. See infra Parts VII–VIII. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  Originally, the Constitution provided for two electoral 
votes per elector for the Presidency and awarded the Vice Presidency to the presidential 
candidate with the second highest number of electoral votes, whether a majority or not. Id. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 7. Id. amend. XII. 
 8. Id. amend. XX, § 3. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. § 4. 
 12. Id. amend. XXV; see also infra Part IV.B. 
 13. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as 
amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).  The 1947 law was the third federal statute codifying the 
line of succession after the President and Vice President. See Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 
Stat. 1 (repealed 1947); Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (repealed 1886). 
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of the national political parties, past precedents, and congressional practices 
to fill a vice presidential vacancy. 
For example, the Democratic Party, at its most recent Convention, 
provided for the filling of a vacancy on the national ticket in the event of 
death, resignation, or disability after adjournment of the Convention of the 
Party’s nominee for President or Vice President.14  It gave such authority to 
the Democratic National Committee, requiring that it confer with the 
Party’s leadership in Congress and the Democratic Governors 
Association.15  Republican Party procedures employ similar provisions.16  
The Republican National Committee is empowered to fill vacancies or 
reconvene the national convention for that purpose.17 
II.  PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND INABILITY PRIOR TO THE TWENTY-
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
A.  The United States Constitution’s Succession Clause 
Any analysis of presidential succession begins with the United States 
Constitution, whose Article II Succession Clause reads: 
 In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said 
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress 
may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or 
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer 
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until 
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.18 
As will be discussed in detail below, the Clause has been the subject of 
much debate.  In particular, since the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
there has been uncertainty as to both the definition of inability as well as the 
critical question of who is to be its judge.  In addition, prior to the 
ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it was unclear whether a 
succession event resulted in the Vice President succeeding to the Office of 
the President itself, or simply assuming the powers and duties of the Office. 
1.  Meaning of “Inability” Under the Succession Clause 
The Constitutional Convention does not indicate to which situations the 
Framers intended the term “inability” to apply.  At the Convention, only 
delegate John Dickinson of Delaware raised this issue by asking, “What is 
the extent of the term ‘disability[?]’”19 
 
 14. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., CALL FOR THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL 
CONVENTION 19 (2007). 
 15. Id. 
 16. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 8 (2008). 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 19. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 427. 
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During President James Garfield’s illness in 1881,20 a number of well-
known legal authorities were of the opinion that “inability” in the 
Succession Clause referred solely to mental incapacity.21  For example, 
Professor Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia Law School, one of the 
leading constitutional authorities of that time, held this view.22  Similarly, 
former Senator William Eaton of Connecticut stated, “There can be no 
disability that the President can be conscious of,” and “It must be a 
disability, as, for example, if he were insane, which is patent to everybody 
except himself.”23 
Others at the time were of the view that “inability” was not restricted 
solely to mental incapacity.  Rather, “a case . . . exists whenever the public 
interest suffers because the President is unable to exercise his 
powers . . . .”24  Indeed, proponents of this view believed that the inability 
provision of the Succession Clause should be construed broadly, covering 
all circumstances that might cause a President to be “unable” to discharge 
the powers and duties of his Office.  For example, it was written at the time 
in the New York Herald that, “The word ‘inability’ . . . means an inability of 
any kind . . . of the body or mind . . . temporary or permanent, . . . [which] 
disables [the President] from discharging the powers and duties of his 
office.”25   Massachusetts Representative Benjamin Butler, when writing of 
President Garfield’s illness, said “inability includes everything in the 
condition of a President which precludes him from the full discharge of the 
powers and duties of his office” in which case “the discharge of these 
powers and duties becomes immediately the duty of the Vice-president.”26  
Other distinguished authorities reasoned that whether or not an inability 
exists often depends on the surrounding circumstances.27 
2.  Who Is To Judge Whether Inability Exists? 
In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the type of situations intended 
to be covered, the Succession Clause also does not specify who is to 
 
 20. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 21. RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 88 (1951). 
 22. See Theodore W. Dwight, Presidential Inability, 133 N. AM. REV. 436, 436–39 
(1881).   
 23. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
133 (1965) (quoting The Question of Disability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1881, at 1). 
 24. See SILVA, supra note 21, at 89. 
 25. FEERICK, supra note 23, at 133 (quoting Does a Case of Constitutional Inability 
Exist?, N.Y. HERALD, Sept. 15, 1881, at 6). 
 26. Benjamin F. Butler, Presidential Inability, 133 N. AM. REV. 428, 428–29 (1881). 
 27. SILVA, supra note 21, at 91 (“The determining consideration in each case is not only 
whether the President is actually unable to exercise his powers but also whether there is any 
public business which requires his personal attention.  It seems to be rather generally agreed 
that a mere inability, however severe or extended, does not constitute an inability in the 
constitutional sense unless the urgency of public affairs calls for action.  In time of serious 
national emergency, for example, an illness of a few days may jeopardize the public interest 
more than an illness of several months at another time.”); see also Thomas M. Cooley, 
Presidential Inability, 133 N. AM. REV. 422, 424–25 (1881); Lyman Trumbull, Presidential 
Inability, 133 N. AM. REV. 417, 420 (1881). 
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determine when an inability exists (and when it ceases).  Again, the debates 
from the Constitutional Convention are mostly silent on this question.  
Again, only John Dickinson raised this problem when asking, “[W]ho is to 
be the judge of [disability]?”28  From that time and until the ratification of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, there were several views relating to the 
proper method of establishing the existence and termination of presidential 
inability.29  This debate provides guidance in answering a crucial question 
should a situation arise beyond the scope of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
a.  Vice President or Other Officer upon Whom the Presidential Functions 
Devolve 
When President Garfield was shot in 1881, an event that brought focus to 
issues regarding the Succession Clause, public opinion favored that the 
successor should determine when a President was disabled.30  While 
President Garfield was incapacitated, most said that it was the obligation of 
Vice President Chester A. Arthur to exercise the powers and duties of the 
President, and “no enabling action by the courts, the Congress, the Cabinet, 
or the President was necessary.”31  Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice 
Lyman Trumbull wrote at the time that “[i]t is questionable whether any 
law can be framed placing this question of inability in a better position than 
the Constitution has left it,” and that whenever there is an obvious case of 
disability, the Vice President should assume power if important public 
business required executive action.32 
Professor Ruth C. Silva, a leading scholar on presidential succession, 
wrote: 
 [Justice] Trumbull was probably correct in saying that the successor 
must shoulder the burden of making the decision in the first instance.  
Since he has the duty of acting as President in certain contingencies, his 
official discretion extends to the determination of whether or not such a 
contingency actually exists.33 
She explained further: 
In contingent grants of power it is a well-established rule of law that the 
one to whom the power is granted is to decide when the emergency has 
arisen.  Thus the Vice President, or the “officer” designated by law to act 
as President, is constituted the judge of a President’s inability in the first 
instance. . . .  The Constitution provides that the power of acting as 
President belongs to the Vice President or to the “Officer” while a 
 
 28. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 427. 
 29. See infra notes 30–64 and accompanying text. 
 30. SILVA, supra note 21, at 100; see also infra Part III.B.3. 
 31. Id. at 100–01. 
 32. Trumbull, supra note 27, at 421–22 (“Any Vice-president who should assume those 
duties in a doubtful case, when the exigency did not unmistakably require it, would be 
treated as a usurper by all patriotic citizens.  Peaceful successions to the Presidency, under 
our system of government, must always depend on a sound public opinion, supported by the 
good sense and the intelligence of the people . . . .”). 
 33. SILVA, supra note 21, at 101. 
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President is disabled.  Since the Constitution mentions only the successor, 
he is the judge of the facts.34 
 In 1961, President John F. Kennedy asked his Attorney General, Robert 
F. Kennedy, to write an opinion regarding the construction to be given to 
the presidential inability provisions of the Succession Clause.35  Attorney 
General Kennedy’s opinion noted, “The large majority [wa]s of the view 
that the Vice President, or other ‘officer’ designated by law to act as 
President has the authority under the Constitution to decide when inability 
exists.”36  The opinion cited the conclusion drawn by President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, that the Vice President 
is the sole judge of a President’s inability where the President is unable to 
do so himself: 
 This is so because the Constitution does not state who should 
determine the President’s inability in the many circumstances in which, as 
the founders themselves must have foreseen, it cannot be the President 
himself.  The Cabinet could not have been intended to judge the issue, 
since this body is not referred to in the Constitution.  It is not the 
Congress, except by the negative sanction of impeachment and conviction 
for a wrongful attempt to exercise power.  Nor is it the Supreme Court, 
because the question of presidential inability is hardly one which fits any 
type of jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution on that tribunal.  But the 
power to determine the inability of the President rests in the Vice 
President not simply because the Constitution places it nowhere else.37  
By a well-known principle of law, whenever any official by law or person 
by private contract is designated to perform certain duties on the 
happening of certain contingencies, unless otherwise specified, that 
person who bears the responsibility for performing the duties must also 
determine when the contingency for the exercise of his powers arises.  
Similarly, under the present Constitution, it is the President who 
determines when his inability has terminated and he is ready once more to 
execute his office.38 
 Similarly, prior to the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, I 
wrote, “As the Constitution is now written, it is the Vice-President’s duty to 
act as President in cases of inability and therefore, by implication, his duty 
to make the determination of inability,”39 noting that Brownell had 
persuasively argued this point. 
 
 34. Id. (citations omitted). 
 35. Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 69 (1961). 
 36. Id. at 88. 
 37. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment formalizes the Vice President’s role in determining 
presidential inability. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 38. Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. at 89 (quoting Herbert Brownell, Jr., 
Presidential Disability:  The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 189, 204 
(1958)). 
 39. John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve 
It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 126 (1963).  In this Article I noted that several cases are 
frequently cited for this proposition. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394, 413 (1928) (giving the President authority to fix rate of custom duties on imports); 
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 700 (1892) (authorizing the President to suspend provisions of 
a tariff act); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827) (allowing the President to 
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b.  Congress 
Others held the view that Congress had the power to decide the question 
of a President’s incapacitation.40  Some of the earliest constitutional 
scholars proposed that the matter could best be handled by concurrent 
resolutions, with one resolution declaring the existence of an inability and a 
subsequent resolution declaring its termination.41  During President 
Garfield’s inability, Governor Jacob B. Jackson of West Virginia argued 
that presidential disability is a political question:  “the only way now in 
which the disability contemplated in the constitutional clauses referring to 
the subject could be announced and the Vice President called to the office 
of the President, was by act of Congress.”42  Additionally, some have 
suggested that the power to remove a disabled President through 
impeachment proceedings may furnish a method for deciding the inability 
question.43 
Advocates for the view that Congress had the power to determine 
presidential inability found more support for the proposition in the 
Constitution’s Elastic Clause.44  Also known as the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, it provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”45  Supporters of this view disagreed with the argument that “the 
grant of power to Congress to designate a successor in case of double 
vacancy necessarily excludes congressional power to legislate on the 
subject of presidential inability,” reasoning that “the power to provide for 
the determination of disability is a power necessary and proper to carry into 
execution the powers vested in the President,” and “providing for the 
determination of presidential inability is necessary to ensure that the 
executive power does not fall into abeyance.”46 
 
call militia into service); Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 
388 (1813) (giving the President power to renew trade with certain countries); see also 
Brownell, Jr., supra note 38, at 199–201. 
 40. See SILVA, supra note 21, at 105 (citing 14 CONG. REC. 1007 (1883) (statement of 
Sen. Charles W. Jones)).  Professor Ruth C. Silva noted that, “The provisional constitution 
of the Confederate States actually did contain such a provision,” and under Article II, 
Section I, Clause 4 of that document, “[T]he President’s inability was to be determined by a 
two-thirds vote of the Congress . . . .” Id. at 105 n.76.  The permanent constitution of the 
Confederacy omitted this provision. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., SILVA, supra note 21, at 105 (discussing former Columbia University 
constitutional law Professor John W. Burgess’s proposal for Congress to determine 
inability). 
 42. A Question for Congress:  Governor Jackson, of West Virginia, on Presidential 
Disability, Views of Ex-Senator Trumbull, Other Opinions as to a Remedy for the Existing 
Situation, N.Y. HERALD, Sept. 9, 1881, at 8. 
 43. See, e.g., SILVA, supra note 21, at 105 (discussing former Virginia Representative 
and constitutional law Professor John Randolph Tucker’s suggestion that Congress may 
remove a disabled President through such proceedings). 
 44. See id. at 106–07. 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 46. See, e.g., SILVA, supra note 21, at 106. 
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Professor Silva noted that “the great weight of opinion . . . support[s] the 
position that Congress has no such power” to determine inability either 
specifically or generally.47  She pointed out that “[t]he speeches in 
Congress have nearly all denied congressional power to provide for cases of 
inability on the ground that the delegation of power to Congress to provide 
for succession beyond the Vice President excludes all other congressional 
power to deal with presidential succession.”48 
Attorney General Brownell agreed that Congress had no such authority if 
there were an able Vice President in place; however, he left open the 
possibility of congressional power on the matter in the event of a double 
vacancy or double disability, writing: 
Since the Constitution confers no power upon Congress in connection 
with presidential inability so long as the Vice President is in office and 
able to act, congressional action under the ‘necessary and proper’ clause 
would seem restricted to the uncommon situation in which both the 
President and the Vice President are incapacitated.49 
c.  The Judiciary 
When President Garfield fell ill, Professor Dwight said that the definition 
of presidential inability is a “judicial question” outside “the sphere of 
legislation.”50  Similarly, John Randolph Tucker, a well-known lawyer and 
commentator at the time, thought the federal courts could be given 
jurisdiction to make the determination of inability “as a case arising under 
the Constitution.”51  Other noted commentators agreed that the federal 
judiciary could determine a President’s disability.  For example, David K. 
Watson suggested that the Attorney General could bring a mandamus action 
against the Vice President, compelling him to exercise the powers and 
duties of the President.52  John W. Burgess added that both the Supreme 
Court and Congress could decide cases of inability.53  While the issues were 
primarily “judicial questions,” “[i]f it should be left to . . . Congress . . . to 
declare when disability happens and when it ceases, I think the solution of 
 
 47. Id. at 107. 
 48. Id.; see also Ruth C. Silva, Presidential Inability, 35 U. DET. L.J. 139, 171 (1957) 
(“The only power expressly given to Congress to provide for presidential succession is the 
power to declare what officer shall act as President when there is neither a functioning 
President nor a functioning Vice President.  This would seem to deny congressional power to 
deal with inability, because enumeration in the Constitution of certain powers denies all 
others unless incident to an expressed power or necessary to its execution . . . .”). 
 49. Brownell, Jr., supra note 38, at 206; see also infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 50. Dwight, supra note 22, at 440. 
 51. 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:  A CRITICAL 
DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION 713 (1899). 
 52. 1 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:  ITS HISTORY 
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 893–95 (1910) (discussing Attorney-General v. Taggart, 
29 A. 1027 (N.H. 1890), where the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the existence 
of an inability may be determined on a petition for mandamus against a governor’s successor 
to compel him to act as governor). 
 53. 2 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
240 (1891). 
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the question which best comports with the spirit of our institutions will have 
been reached.”54 
Professor Silva disagreed about judicial involvement, writing, “It is 
certain that the Supreme Court could not be given original jurisdiction to 
make this determination.  For the Court has already ruled that its original 
jurisdiction is limited to that set forth in the Constitution.”55  Over the 
years, many bills had been proposed that would give the Supreme Court 
original jurisdiction to determine presidential inability.56  When the 
Marbury objection was raised during 1920 congressional hearings on such a 
proposal, Representative John J. Rogers of Massachusetts, the bill’s author, 
“had no answer.”57  At the same hearings, Minnesota Representative 
Andrew Volstead suggested that the lower federal courts could be given this 
jurisdiction, to which Ohio Representative Simeon Fess responded that only 
a constitutional amendment could confer federal jurisdiction, categorizing 
the issue as “political and not justiciable.”58 
d.  The Cabinet 
Some, principally former members of the executive branch, have 
suggested that the Cabinet might declare a President’s inability.59  Former 
President Herbert Hoover suggested a commission of between seven and 
fifteen heads of executive departments or agencies, reasoning that “a 
President’s inability . . . should be determined by the . . . [political] party 
having the responsibilities determined by the election.”60  Indeed, two bills 
were introduced to allow the Cabinet to declare an inability during 
President Woodrow Wilson’s illnesses.61  The main legal question 
regarding those bills was “whether Congress had power to authorize the 
Cabinet to determine a President’s inability.”62 
Critics of allowing the Cabinet to play a role, including former Attorney 
General Brownell, pointed out that this would be antithetical to original 
meaning as the framers could not have intended the Cabinet, a body not 
referred to in the Constitution, to judge the issue of disability.63  During 
President Garfield’s illness, West Virginia Governor Jackson answered 
former President Ulysses S. Grant’s suggestion that the President’s 
physician certify his inability to the Cabinet by saying, “The Cabinet cannot 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. SILVA, supra note 21, at 103 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 103–04. 
 59. Id. at 107; Feerick, supra note 39, at 113. 
 60. Presidential Inability:  Hearing on S.J. Res 100 et al. Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 11 (1958). 
 61. SILVA, supra note 21, at 107. 
 62. Id. at 107–08. 
 63. See, e.g., Brownell, Jr., supra note 38, at 204; see also supra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
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and ought not to decide it, for its members are the creatures of the 
President, called to and continued in office at his pleasure.”64 
B.  History of Presidential Disability prior to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment65 
1.  Madison’s Illness 
In 1813, President James Madison suffered an illness that left him unable 
to conduct the responsibilities of the Office for three weeks, setting off 
widespread discussion of presidential succession.  Word traveled that 
President Madison was critically ill, and attention focused on the possible 
succession of Vice President Elbridge Gerry, then almost sixty-nine years 
old.  There was speculation that the President might not survive, and there 
was concern over the ability of Vice President Gerry if he were to assume 
the Office.66  Both houses of Congress became engrossed with the 
possibility of Madison’s death and Gerry’s succession. 
President Madison slowly began to recover from his illness, and on July 
2, First Lady Dolly Madison wrote that the President’s fever had subsided 
and he was improving.  On July 7 it was announced that the President had 
resumed the most urgent public business, meeting with a Senate committee 
a week later.  Madison spent time in his Montpelier home in August where 
his health continued to improve, and when he returned to Washington in 
October of 1813, it was clear his recovery was complete. 
2.  Tyler Precedent 
What became known as the “Tyler Precedent” concerned the question of 
whether a succeeding Vice President ascended to the Office of the President 
itself, or merely assumed the powers and duties of the Office upon the 
President’s death.  On April 4, 1841, President William Henry Harrison, 
then the oldest President at inauguration, died of pneumonia.  When news 
reached Vice President John Tyler, he immediately headed to Washington 
where he took the presidential oath of office.  Tyler made clear his belief 
that he ascended to the Office of the President itself and was not merely 
acting as President. 
 
 64. A Question for Congress, Governor Jackson, of West Virginia, on Presidential 
Disability., Views of Ex-Senator Trumbull, Other Opinions as to a Remedy for the Existing 
Situation, N.Y. HERALD, Sept. 9, 1881, at 8. 
 65. Part III.B is adapted from chapters one and four of JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-
FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992). 
 66. French Minister Louis Serurier wrote on June 21: 
  The thought of [Madison’s] possible loss strikes everybody with consternation.  
It is certainly true that his death in the circumstances in which the Republic is 
placed, would be a veritable national calamity.  The President who would succeed 
him for three and a half years is a respectable old man, but weak and worn out.  All 
good Americans pray for the recovery of Mr. Madison. 
Id. at 4. 
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Tyler’s ascendancy to the “Office” of the President was not without 
dispute, and leaders of the Whig Party referred to him simply as the “Acting 
President.”  John Quincy Adams, a former President of the United States 
and at the time of the Tyler Precedent a member of the House of 
Representatives, noted in his diary:  “[Tyler’s assumption of the Office of 
the President] is a construction in direct violation both of the grammar and 
context of the Constitution, which confers upon the Vice-President, on the 
decease of the President, not the office, but the powers and duties of the 
said office.”67 
Upon the convening of the special session of the Twenty-Seventh 
Congress on May 31, 1841, Tyler’s assumption of the Presidency came 
under attack.  When Virginia Representative Henry A. Wise introduced a 
resolution calling for the formation of a committee “to wait on the President 
of the United States,” New York Representative John McKeon moved to 
strike “President” and replace it with “Vice-President, now exercising the 
office of the President.”68  Representative McKeon further stated that “a 
grave constitutional question” had been presented, and this question should 
be set “at rest for all future time.”  However, the House of Representatives 
rejected McKeon’s suggestion and passed the Wise resolution. 
The Tyler Precedent was formalized upon the ratification of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, which makes clear that upon a President’s death, 
removal, or resignation, the Vice President succeeds to the Office of the 
President.69 
3.  Garfield’s Inability 
On July 2, 1881, the nation was faced with its first prolonged case of 
presidential inability when President Garfield was shot by an assassin and 
wavered between life and death for the next eighty days. 
During this period, the President’s visitors were restricted to family and 
physicians, with only occasional visits from members of his Cabinet.  
During President Garfield’s inability period, his doctors determined he 
needed rest to have any chance at recovery and prevented him from 
discharging his powers and duties.  His only official act during this time 
was the signing of an extradition paper on August 10.  The Cabinet tried to 
keep the wheels of government turning, but there was much the members 
could not do, such as handling foreign affairs. 
In late August, Secretary of State James Blaine prepared a paper on 
presidential inability, arguing that since the Constitution contained no 
directions for replacing a disabled President, Vice President Arthur should 
be called to Washington to take over the Presidency.  Only a few members 
of the Cabinet agreed, with a majority of the view that under the Tyler 
Precedent, any succession by Vice President Arthur would be to the Office 
 
 67. 10 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS:  COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 
1795–1848, at 463–64 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876). 
 68. FEERICK, supra note 65, at 6. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
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of the President for the remainder of the term.  Arthur, however, fearful of 
being labeled a usurper, made it clear that he would not assume presidential 
responsibility. 
Following President Garfield’s death on September 19, 1881, the debate 
over the meaning of the Succession Clause continued in the press, legal 
journals, and Congress.  When Vice President Arthur succeeded to the 
Presidency, there was no Vice President, no President pro tempore of the 
Senate, and no Speaker of the House of Representatives—in short, no 
constitutional successor to the Presidency.  Newly-elevated President 
Arthur recognized this problem, and in several messages to Congress, he 
expressed concern over the ambiguities of the succession provision.70 
4.  Wilson’s Inability 
On October 2, 1919, President Wilson suffered a stroke that paralyzed 
the left side of his body.  The President’s close friend and physician, Dr. 
Cary Grayson, released a bulletin stating, “The President is a very sick 
man.”  From that time until the inauguration of President Warren G. 
Harding on March 4, 1921, the country was without the services of an able 
President. 
While President Wilson lay ill and unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of office, attempts were made to provide executive leadership.  
Secretary of State Robert Lansing suggested to the President’s secretary, 
Joseph Tumulty, that the Vice President be called upon to act as President.  
When Secretary Lansing suggested that either Dr. Grayson or Tumulty 
certify the President disabled, Tumulty declared, “You may rest assured 
that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the White House on the broad of his 
back I will not be a party to ousting him.”71  In the days and weeks 
following President Wilson’s stroke, there were repeated demands for Vice 
President Thomas Marshall to act as President, but the confusion 
surrounding the succession provision, coupled with Vice President 
Marshall’s reluctance to appear as a usurper, prevented him from so acting. 
 
 70. President Chester A. Arthur wrote: 
Is the inability limited in its nature to long-continued intellectual incapacity, or has 
it a broader import?  What must be its extent and duration?  How must its 
existence be established?  Has the President whose inability is the subject of 
inquiry any voice in determining whether or not it exists, or is the decision of that 
momentous and delicate question confided to the Vice-President, or is it 
contemplated by the Constitution that Congress should provide by law precisely 
what should constitute inability and how and by what tribunal or authority it 
should be ascertained?  If the inability proves to be temporary in its nature, and 
during its continuance the Vice-President lawfully exercises the functions of the 
Executive, by what tenure does he hold his office?  Does he continue as President 
for the remainder of the four years’ term?  Or would the elected President, if his 
inability should cease in the interval, be empowered to resume his office?  And if, 
having such lawful authority, he should exercise it, would the Vice-President be 
thereupon empowered to resume his powers and duties as such? 
FEERICK, supra note 65, at 10. 
 71. JOSEPH P. TUMULTY, WOODROW WILSON AS I KNOW HIM 443–44 (1921). 
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5.  Eisenhower’s Inabilities 
On September 24, 1955, President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack 
while vacationing in Colorado.  That evening, Vice President Richard M. 
Nixon met with members of the Cabinet to discuss arrangements for 
operation of the executive branch during President Eisenhower’s recovery 
in Denver.  It was decided that the Cabinet and White House should 
continue the administration of the government.  The Cabinet agreed on the 
following procedure:  First, on actions that Cabinet members would 
normally take without consulting either the Cabinet or the President, there 
would be no change from the normal.  Second, on questions which would 
normally be brought before the Cabinet for discussion before any decision 
should continue to be discussed there.  Third, decisions requiring 
consultation with the President should first go to the Cabinet or the National 
Security Council for thorough discussion and possible recommendation 
before going to President Eisenhower in Denver for his consideration.  
Although this system worked without incident, presidential assistant 
Sherman Adams noted that it left everyone “uncomfortably aware of the 
Constitution’s failure to provide for the direction of the government by an 
acting President when the President is temporarily disabled and unable to 
perform his functions.”72 
The question of inability was revived on two other occasions during the 
Eisenhower administration.  On June 8, 1956, the President had an attack of 
ileitis and was taken to Walter Reed hospital.  The following day, he 
underwent a two-hour operation for the removal of an obstruction of the 
small intestine, during which he was unconscious.  The President was up 
and walking by June 10 and deemed “fully recovered” by August 27. 
The other incident occurred on November 25, 1957, when the President 
suffered a stroke affecting his ability to speak.  The next day, members of 
his staff met to discuss President Eisenhower’s condition.  However, 
medical bulletins indicated that his health had improved, and by December 
2, the President was back at work in the White House. 
As Congress pondered the inability problem, President Eisenhower 
became increasingly concerned about the recurrence of another case of 
inability.  He therefore drafted and presented to Vice President Nixon an 
informal “letter agreement,” which offered an imaginative and practical 
approach to the inability problem.  The agreement was released to the 
public and provided: 
(1) In the event of inability the President would—if possible—so inform 
the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as Acting 
President, exercising the powers and duties of the office until the inability 
had ended. 
(2) In the event of an inability which would prevent the President from so 
communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such 
consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would 
 
 72. FEERICK, supra note 65, at 20 (internal citation omitted). 
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decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and 
would serve as Acting President until the inability had ended. 
(3) The President, in either event, would determine when the inability had 
ended and at that time would resume the full exercise of the powers and 
duties of the Office.73 
 Later, President Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson, 
President Johnson and House Speaker John W. McCormack, and President 
Johnson and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr. adopted similar 
understandings.  However, these letter agreements did not have the force of 
law behind them and depended entirely on the good will of the incumbent 
President and Vice President.  Nevertheless, they represented the first 
significant step toward solving the inability problem. 
6.  Kennedy’s Assassination 
On November 22, 1963, the nation experienced one of its most shocking 
tragedies when President Kennedy was assassinated.  Efforts made to save 
the President, though unsuccessful, underscored again the absence of 
procedures to account for the case in which a President might linger 
unconscious, either for days or for a more extended period of time.74  
Succession beyond the Vice Presidency also came into focus as rumors 
circulated that Vice President Johnson had suffered a heart attack shortly 
after President Kennedy had been shot.  Fortunately, there was no truth to 
these rumors, and the nation did not have to test the adequacy of succession 
beyond the Vice Presidency under the 1947 succession law. 
III.  THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
A.  Ratification 
The tragic death of President Kennedy revived the conversation on the 
need to solve the problems of presidential succession and inability.  
Following President Kennedy’s assassination, Vice President Johnson 
immediately succeeded to the Office of the President, leaving the Vice 
Presidency vacant.75  From November 22, 1963 until January 20, 1965, the 
United States had no Vice President.76  Further, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, the successors 
to President Johnson under the succession statute, “were both aged and, 
 
 73. Id. at 55–56 (internal citation omitted). 
 74. James Reston of The New York Times noted that “[f]or an all too brief hour today, it 
was not clear again what would have happened if the young President, instead of being 
mortally wounded, had lingered for a long time between life and death, strong enough to 
survive but too weak to govern.” James Reston, Why America Weeps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 
1963, at 1. 
 75. Felix Belair Jr., Kennedy Is Killed by Sniper As He Rides in Car in Dallas; Johnson 
Sworn in on Plane:  Texan Asks Unity, Congressional Chiefs of 2 Parties Give Promise of 
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1963, at 1. 
 76. Richard M. Merelman, Presidential Disability and Succession:  The Proposed 25th 
Amendment:  What Are Its Provisions?, GRASS ROOTS GUIDES 9 (1965). 
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even by their own admission, doubtful about their capacities to fill the 
Presidency, should that eventuality arise.”77  It became clear that providing 
another means for filling the vacancy, like allowing the President to choose 
a new Vice President, was necessary.78 
A number of congressional proposals addressing presidential inability 
and succession followed President Kennedy’s death.  Senator Birch Bayh of 
Indiana, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments, and several other senators proposed a constitutional 
amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 139, “containing provisions on 
inability, filling a vice presidential vacancy, and succession beyond the vice 
presidency.”79  President Johnson informed the Senate that he unqualifiedly 
endorsed the proposed amendment.80 
In conjunction with Senator Bayh’s proposal, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) formed a conference of twelve lawyers to examine the 
problems and offer recommendations.81  At this two-day conference it was 
decided that agreements between the President and Vice President, such as 
that between Eisenhower and Nixon, provided only a partial solution to the 
inability problem.  The ABA conference proceeded to recommend that an 
amendment to the Constitution should be adopted to permanently resolve 
the problems arising in the event of the inability of the President. 
The conference recommended that in the event of presidential inability, 
the powers and duties of the President, but not the Office, would devolve 
upon the Vice President, or person next in the line of succession, for the 
duration of the inability or until expiration of the President’s term.  Further, 
it was suggested that “[t]he amendment should provide that the inability of 
the President may be established by declaration in writing of the 
President,”82 and “[i]n the event that the President does not make known his 
inability, it may be established by action of the Vice President or person 
next in line of succession with concurrence of a majority of the 
Cabinet . . . .”83 
The conference also considered the related question of presidential 
succession, agreeing that the “Constitution should be amended to provide 
that in the event of the death, resignation or removal of the President, the 
Vice President or the person next in the line of succession shall succeed to 
the office for the unexpired term,”84 because it “is highly desirable that the 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 10. 
 79. FEERICK, supra note 65, at 59. 
 80. Interview by Paige E. Mulhollan with Senator Birch Bayh (Feb. 12, 1969), available 
at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Bayh-B/Bayh.pdf. 
 81. The following discussion of the ABA conference and the ratification of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment is adapted from chapters five and six of FEERICK, supra note 65.  For a 
detailed description of the work of the ABA conference, see FEERICK, supra note 23, at 246–
54; see also John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability:  The Problem and a Solution, 50 A.B.A. 
J. 321, 323–24 (1964); James C. Kirby, Jr., A Breakthrough on Presidential Inability:  The 
ABA Conference Consensus, 17 VAND. L. REV. 463, 475–78 (1964). 
 82. FEERICK, supra note 65, at 60 (internal citation omitted). 
 83. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 84. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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office of the Vice President be filled at all times.”85  The ABA endorsed the 
conference consensus on February 17, 1964, and it was formally presented 
to the Subcommittee on Congressional Amendments on February 24. 
At the hearings of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments in 
1964, a majority of the witnesses expressed support for the inability 
provisions proposed by the ABA.  As a national consensus on the inability 
problem gradually began to take shape along the lines of the ABA 
approach, widespread agreement arose at the hearings on the need for 
having a Vice President at all times.  The Vice President would provide for 
an orderly transfer of executive authority in the event of the death of a 
President. 
While there was general agreement regarding the need for a Vice 
President, the measures and recommendations presented to Senator Bayh’s 
Subcommittee differed on the means of filling such a vacancy.86  
Eventually it was decided that whenever there is a vacancy in the Vice 
Presidency, the President would nominate a Vice President, who would take 
office after confirmation by both houses of Congress.87 
As Congress debated the proposed amendment, many of the ABA’s 
recommendations were adopted, while others were amended or eliminated 
from the final legislation.  For example, the recommendation that the Vice 
President, or person next in the line of succession, with concurrence of a 
majority of the Cabinet (or other body provided for by Congress), would 
establish presidential inability was not fully adopted in the final legislation.  
The final version of the Amendment provides only for the Vice President to 
declare the President disabled with concurrence by the Cabinet (or other 
body provided by Congress), remaining silent on the ability of the person 
next in line to do so, as suggested by the ABA proposal.88 
After numerous Congressional hearings, the final version of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment passed the House and the Senate in 1965, was ratified by 
the necessary state legislatures on February 10, 1967, and was formally 
proclaimed the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution at a White 
House ceremony held on February 23, 1967. 
B.  An Analysis of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution establishes procedures 
for filling a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President and for responding 
to presidential disabilities.  There are four sections of the Amendment, each 
providing different procedures depending on the specific circumstance. 
Section 1 provides, “In case of the removal of the President from office 
or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.”89  
 
 85. Id. at 61 (internal citation omitted). 
 86. Proposals for filling a vice presidential vacancy included presidential nomination, 
congressional selection, the election of two Vice Presidents every four years, the 
reconvening of the last electoral college to select a new Vice President, and a new election. 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. 
 88. See id. § 4. 
 89. Id. § 1. 
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This Section formalizes the precedent set when Vice President Tyler 
claimed the title of “President” after the death of President Harrison. 
Section 2 provides, “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the 
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take 
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.”90  
The use of “whenever” and “shall” clarifies that the President must 
nominate a person for Vice President in the event of a vacancy.  The history 
of Section 2 manifests the intention that there be both a President and a 
Vice President at all times, and whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of 
the Vice President, both the President and Congress must act with 
“reasonable dispatch” to fill it.91  Thus, Section 2 reflects the increased 
significance and role the Vice President plays in the government.92 
Section 3 provides: 
 Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written 
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, 
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as 
Acting President.93 
This section affords the President discretion in declaring his own inability 
and makes clear that in such a case, the Vice President is to discharge the 
powers and duties of the Presidency.  In a disability situation under Section 
3, the Vice President does not assume the Office or title of “President.” 
Section 4 of the Amendment provides a mechanism for the Vice 
President and a majority of either the “principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide” to 
declare the President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, in the event the President does not do so himself.94  This section 
covers the most difficult cases of inability—when the President cannot or 
refuses to declare his own inability. 
The terms “unable” and “inability” are undefined in either Section 3 or 4 
of the Amendment, not as the result of an oversight, but rather “a judgment 
that a rigid constitutional definition was undesirable, since cases of inability 
could take various forms not neatly fitting into such a definition.”95  
 
 90. Id. § 2. 
 91. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President:  
Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 63–67 (1965); Presidential Inability:  Hearing on H.R. 
836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 66 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 
House Hearing]; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTION REFORM, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1974) (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review). 
 92. For a detailed description of the Vice Presidency, see JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE 
MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 
(1982). 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3. 
 94. Id. § 4. 
 95. FEERICK, supra note 65, at 197. 
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Circumstances commonly thought to fall under these Sections include cases 
of mental inability, as well as situations where the President might be 
kidnapped or captured, under an oxygen tent at a time of enemy attack, or 
bereft of speech or sight.96  The debates of 1964 and 1965 made clear that 
unpopularity, incompetence, impeachable conduct, poor judgment, and 
laziness do not constitute an “inability” within the meaning of the 
Amendment.97 
C.  History Post-Ratification 
1.  Reagan’s Assassination Attempt 
On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinkley, Jr. shot President Ronald Reagan 
as he exited the Washington Hilton Hotel after delivering a speech.98  At 
first it was unclear whether President Reagan had been struck by one of the 
bullets in his left side, or if he had instead only broken a rib when Secret 
Service agents shoved him into his limousine after hearing the shots fired.99  
In fact, a bullet had bounced off the President’s limousine and hit the 
President.100  The bullet, a “Devastator” bullet designed to explode on 
impact, never exploded.101  The prognosis the doctors gave for President 
Reagan’s recovery was incredibly positive, and because the bullet had not 
struck the heart, Dr. Dennis O’Leary, a spokesperson for the George 
Washington Hospital where Reagan was treated, said the President “was 
never in any serious danger.”102 
As the President underwent surgery to remove the bullet, events at the 
White House took on historical significance.103  When President Reagan 
was shot, Vice President George H.W. Bush was en route from Fort Worth 
to Austin, Texas, for a speech.104  Upon hearing the news, Vice President 
Bush headed back to Washington, D.C. immediately.105  There, members of 
the Cabinet and staff gathered in the White House Situation Room.106  
President Reagan’s Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., noted in his 
memoirs that the officials handling the crisis were “an ad hoc group; no 
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plan existed, we possessed no list of guidelines, no chart that established 
rank or function.  Our work was a matter of calling on experience and 
exercising judgment.”107 
Less than two hours after the shooting, Deputy Press Secretary Larry 
Speakes held a press briefing where he was unable to answer many 
questions about the President’s status and about the administration’s crisis 
management plan.108  When asked, “Is the President in surgery?,” Speakes 
replied, “I can’t say.”109  When asked, “Who’s running the government 
right now?,” he responded, “I cannot answer that question at this time.”110  
Finally, when asked, “[W]ho’ll be determining the status of the President 
and whether the Vice President should, in fact, become the acting 
President?,” he replied, “I don’t know the details on that.”111  A concerned 
Secretary Haig dashed from the Situation Room to the White House press 
room where he infamously declared, “I am in control here” to the question, 
“Who is making the decisions for the government right now?”112 
The Reagan administration did not invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
during the crisis surrounding the attempted assassination of the President.  
Accounts vary, but “it seems clear that the issue was resolved by a handful 
of officials without the kind of formal action by the Cabinet and Vice 
President that the Amendment contemplated” under Section 4.113 
Fred F. Fielding, White House Counsel for President Reagan at the time, 
described in detail his eyewitness account of these events at the Fordham 
Law Review’s April 2010 symposium: 
 Upon word of the shooting and that the President had actually been hit, 
I called the National Security Adviser and we started to assemble people 
in the Situation Room, which is, of course, the secure facility within the 
White House complex. . . . 
 The group that gathered in the Situation Room that day consisted of 
ten or more individuals, people leaving and coming at various points.  It 
wasn’t a full Cabinet meeting, but rather an ad hoc assembly of 
people. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The scene in the Situation Room, if I could try to describe it, was 
obviously apprehensive, but it wasn’t harried or frantic.  Again, go back 
 
 107. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT:  REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY 153 
(1984). 
 108. FEERICK, supra note 65, at xii. 
 109. HAIG, JR., supra note 107, at 158. 
 110. Id. at 159. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 160.  The full text of Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s response is: 
  Constitutionally, gentlemen, you have the President, the Vice President, and the 
Secretary of State, in that order, and should the President decide he wants to 
transfer the helm, he will do so.  He has not done that.  As of now, I am in control 
here, in the White House, pending return of the Vice President and in close touch 
with him.  If something came up, I would check with him, of course. 
Id. 
 113. FEERICK, supra note 65, at xiii. 
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to context.  The people that were in the room were professionals.  The 
Cabinet had only recently been assembled.  These were people that had 
come from different backgrounds.  Some people came from the 
President’s California retinue and his governor’s team.  Others were 
former Nixon Administration officials.  Some were brand new to the 
whole thing.  In all fairness, this was a roomful of strangers who really 
operated fairly well together under these circumstances. 
 While no one approached me or the Attorney General with any 
requests for papers sufficient to exercise Section 3 or 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment during the time I was there, I had earlier prepared such 
papers.  I had them with me in draft, for both Section 3 and Section 4 
coverage. 
 . . . . 
 As we all know, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was not invoked on 
March 30.  I have read that during that tense afternoon the draft Sections 3 
and 4 letters were pulled from my hands and sealed in a safe.  It’s not so.  
But think how silly that sounds.  It wasn’t a great secret that the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment was in play, if you will.  To say that suddenly things 
were pulled and put in a safe sounds very silly. 
 It is true that we were informed that the bullet had been removed from 
the President’s lung after surgery, and an hour later, we were informed 
that doctors were very confident of a full recovery.  That news quelled 
any further thoughts or discussion about invoking the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment until the Vice President returned.  He was en route back.  Of 
course, once he got back, he met with us, in an expanded group in the 
Situation Room.  The group of us—the Attorney General, I, the Chief of 
Staff, and Secretary [of Defense] Weinberger, but not the Secretary of 
State, went into the Vice President’s office.  There we discussed whether 
Section 4 should be invoked, at that point.  The decision was made that it 
should not be.  The next morning the President was alert.  He was joking, 
writing notes to people.  He met and conducted some very minor official 
tasks, with the cameras being there to show that the President was 
working.  The Vice President met with the senior staff and oversaw 
routine business. 
 Some have contended that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should still 
have been under consideration in the course of the ensuing days.  The 
President recovered gradually and underwent additional procedures.  
People presumably were talking about Section 4, or a prompting by the 
President to engage in Section 3.  But if the amendment hadn’t been 
triggered on the day of the shooting, hadn’t been triggered that evening, it 
certainly was not going to be willingly engaged, absent a change in the 
President’s health, by the mere virtue of his understandably reduced 
schedule.  The world had been told he was recovering, and, thankfully, 
that’s what turned out to be the case.114 
 
 114. Fred Fielding, Keynote Speaker at the Fordham Law Review Symposium:  The 
Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 21st Century:  Filling the Gaps and 
Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional and Extraconstitutional Arrangements (Apr. 16, 
2010), in 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 827–29 (2010). 
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2.  Reagan’s Cancer Surgery 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was implicated for a second time during 
the Reagan Administration on July 12, 1985, when the President entered 
Bethesda Naval Hospital for a surgical procedure to remove a polyp from 
his colon.115  Before undergoing anesthesia, President Reagan signed a 
document addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President pro tempore of the Senate transferring power to Vice President 
Bush as Acting President, while also disclaiming any formal use of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.116  The document read, in relevant part: 
 After consultation with my counsel and the Attorney General, I am 
mindful of the provisions of Section 3 of the 25th Amendment to the 
Constitution and of the uncertainties of its application to such brief and 
temporary periods of incapacity.  I do not believe that the drafters of this 
amendment intended its application to situations such as the instant one. 
  Nevertheless, consistent with my longstanding arrangement with Vice 
President George Bush, and not intending to set a precedent binding 
anyone privileged to hold the office in the future, I have determined and it 
is my intention and direction, that Vice President George Bush shall 
discharge those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance.117 
Five hours after surgery, Fielding and Chief of Staff Donald Regan 
informally tested President Reagan to determine his readiness to resume the 
Presidency by handing him a two-sentence letter addressed to the 
congressional leaders.118  The letter read: 
  Following up on my letter to you of this date, please be advised I am 
able to resume the discharge of the constitutional powers and duties of the 
office of the President of the United States.  I have informed the Vice 
President of my determination and my resumption of those powers and 
duties.119 
Upon receiving this letter from Fielding and Regan, Reagan quickly replied, 
“Gimme a pen” and signed the letter.120 
Although President Reagan’s initial letter disclaimed any use of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, he followed all the guidelines and procedures 
specified in Section 3.121  Further, no constitutional provision except the 
 
 115. FEERICK, supra note 65, at xv. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Texts of Reagan’s Letters, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1985, at 20; see also 131 CONG. 
REC. 19,008–09 (1985) (containing the text of President Reagan’s letter to Hon. Strom 
Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate). 
 118. FEERICK, supra note 65, at xv–xvi. 
 119. Texts of Reagan’s Letters, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1985, at 20; see also 131 CONG. 
REC. 19,009 (1985) (containing the text of President Reagan’s letter to Hon. Strom 
Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate). 
 120. FEERICK, supra note 65, at xvi. 
 121. Section 3 of the Amendment states: 
  Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to 
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Twenty-Fifth Amendment would have allowed President Reagan to 
designate the Vice President as the Acting President.122  President Reagan’s 
disclaimer was likely made for two reasons:  “fear of the reaction of the 
country and the world to a ‘President’ who admitted to being disabled, and 
concern that admitting to the Amendment’s invocation would set a harmful 
precedent for the presidency.”123 
President Reagan’s later account of the event even mentioned invoking 
the Amendment: 
  Before they wheeled me into the operating room, I signed a letter 
invoking the Twenty-fifth Amendment, making George Bush acting 
president during the time I was incapacitated under anesthesia.  They gave 
me a shot of Pentathol and I awoke several hours later feeling groggy and 
confused . . . . 
 . . . . 
  Later, when I was fully alert, I signed a letter reclaiming the 
presidency from George . . . .124 
Nancy Reagan’s account mirrored that of the President: 
  The operation began at eleven o’clock that Saturday morning.  Half an 
hour earlier, Ronnie had signed the papers authorizing George Bush to be 
acting president for the next eight hours.  This was the first time the 
provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment had ever been put into 
effect. . . .  Fred Fielding, the White House counsel, came in with the 
documents, which were then delivered to Speaker Tip O’Neill, and to 
Strom Thurmond, president pro tempore of the Senate.125 
3.  Appointment of Gerald Ford as Vice President 
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was first invoked in 1973, 
following Spiro T. Agnew’s resignation as Vice President on October 10.126  
Two days later, President Richard M. Nixon nominated Representative 
Gerald R. Ford of Michigan to replace Agnew.127 
At Fordham Law Review’s presidential succession symposium, Benton 
Becker, counsel to Ford during his vice presidential confirmation hearings, 
discussed the incredible scope of the vetting process.  Becker noted that the 
inquiry into Ford’s life was “far far more detailed, because there were many 
people in Washington in September of 1973 who believed that this nominee 
 
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be 
discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. 
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 122. FEERICK, supra note 65, at xvi. 
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 124. RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 500 (1990). 
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 126. See FEERICK, supra note 65, at 124–26. 
 127. Richard L. Madden, Gerald Ford Named by Nixon As the Successor to Agnew:  
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was going to be President, one way or another.  Sooner or later, Richard 
Nixon was going to resign or be impeached.”128  The background check 
into Ford included an immediate designation of seventy-two FBI agents 
working full-time on the matter.  In fact, it was so extensive that it even 
included questioning a halfback from Ohio State University who had played 
college football against Ford, who was asked to give details of an 
unnecessary roughness penalty called against the future President.129 
The United States Senate voted 92–3 to confirm Ford on November 27, 
1973,130 and the House of Representatives did the same, voting 387–35.131  
Immediately following his confirmation as the Vice President, Ford was 
administered the vice presidential oath by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
before a joint meeting of the Congress held in the chamber of the House of 
Representatives.132 
4.  Succession of Gerald Ford to the Presidency and Appointment of Nelson 
Rockefeller as Vice President 
Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was first invoked on August 
9, 1974, when President Nixon resigned from office, triggering Vice 
President Ford’s succession to the Office of the President for the rest of the 
term and leaving a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. 133  On August 20, 
1974, acting under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, President 
Ford nominated former New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller to 
replace him,134 who was confirmed by Congress and sworn into office four 
months later.135 
5.  George W. Bush’s Invocations 
On both June 29, 2002, and July 21, 2007, President George W. Bush 
invoked Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment when undergoing 
medical procedures requiring sedation, thereby temporarily transferring his 
powers and duties to Vice President Dick Cheney as the Acting 
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President.136  In contrast to President Reagan’s letters, President Bush’s 
letters to congressional leaders specifically cited Section 3 of the 
Amendment, marking the first time this Section was invoked explicitly.137 
D.  An Appraisal138 
The extraordinary occurrence of the resignations of an elected President 
and Vice President within the same four-year term (Nixon and Agnew) and 
their replacement by a President and a Vice President selected under 
Section 2 drew considerable attention to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  At 
that time, Journalist James Reston wrote, “On the brief record of the 25th 
Amendment, it has served the nation well under extraordinary and 
unforeseen circumstances.”139 
When charges of criminal wrongdoing were leveled against Vice 
President Agnew, the option of resignation was viable partly because of the 
procedures of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Without it, it is possible that 
significant pressure against resignation would have developed because a 
resignation would have placed a member of the opposition party at the head 
of the line of succession.  However, with the Amendment in place, the 
administration was able to consider whether a resignation was in the 
national interest without having to worry about a lack of party continuity in 
the executive branch should something happen to the President. 
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The Amendment also assisted the country during the difficult 
impeachment proceedings against President Nixon.  Since the Amendment 
had operated to replace a Republican Vice President with a Vice President 
from the same party, Congress was able to conduct the impeachment in the 
months that followed with the knowledge that it could not be charged with 
attempting to turn over control of the executive to the Democrats by 
installing the House Speaker as President.  Because of the Amendment, 
President Nixon was able to resign in 1974 without having to surrender his 
party’s control of the White House. 
At the 1975 review hearings on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, New Jersey 
Representative Peter Rodino discussed the Amendment: 
 I think it is unquestionable that without section 2 of the 25th 
amendment, this Nation might not have endured nearly so well the ordeal 
of its recent constitutional crisis. 
 . . . . 
 Had there been no amendment, not only would the Nixon and Agnew 
resignations still have left the Nation without a nationally elected 
executive, but the uncertainty and partisan divisions which would have 
been inherent in the operation of the succession statutes might have 
threatened the very constitutional process which ultimately preserved our 
institutions.  Or, barring that, they might have rendered any “new 
administration” wholly unable to govern.140 
 Invocations of Section 3, occurring twice under President George W. 
Bush, proceeded smoothly and without confusion or delay, providing for a 
continuous operation of the executive branch with the President temporarily 
sedated.  Section 4 of the Amendment, perhaps the strongest test the 
inability provisions might face, has yet to be tested. 
IV.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCIES 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has been effective in promoting stability 
in the government; however, troubling scenarios are still imaginable, in 
particular if a succession event were to occur with the Vice Presidency 
vacant.  As our history indicates, such a circumstance is not uncommon. 
The first vacancy in the Vice Presidency occurred in 1812 upon the death 
of George Clinton.141  Since that time, six other Vice Presidents have died 
in office:  Elbridge Gerry (1814), William R. King (1853), Henry Wilson 
(1875), Thomas A. Hendricks (1885), Garrett A. Hobart (1899), and James 
 
 140. Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth 
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S. Sherman (1912).142  In addition, there have been several other instances 
when the Office has been vacant:143 
1832–33:  Vice President John C. Calhoun resigned from office 
1841–45:  Vice President John Tyler became President upon the death of 
President William Henry Harrison 
1850–53:  Vice President Millard Fillmore became President upon the 
death of President Zachary Taylor 
1865–69:  Vice President Andrew Johnson became President upon the 
death of President Abraham Lincoln 
1881–85:  Vice President Chester A. Arthur became President upon the 
death of President James Garfield 
1901–05:  Vice President Theodore Roosevelt became President upon the 
death of President William McKinley, Jr. 
1923–25:  Vice President Calvin Coolidge became President upon the 
death of President Warren G. Harding 
1945–49:  Vice President Harry S. Truman became President upon the 
death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
1963–65:  Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson became President upon the 
death of President John F. Kennedy 
1973:  Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned from office144 
1974:  Vice President Gerald Ford became President upon the resignation 
of President Richard Nixon145 
Potential gaps in current succession law are mainly attributable to scenarios 
where there is no functioning Vice President.146 
V.  GAPS IN THE CURRENT SUCCESSION LAW 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides valuable safeguards for ensuring 
continuity of government by requiring the President to nominate a Vice 
President in the event of a vacancy as well as providing procedures for 
responding to disabilities.  However, the Amendment does not provide for 
every possible disability scenario, leaving certain succession contingencies 
unaddressed.147  In addition, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not address 
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difficult ratification process.  Included were solutions to the problems identified by history. 
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Election Day scenarios relevant to the succession discussion.148  Professor 
Akhil Reed Amar has written several articles detailing gaps in current 
succession law.149 
Most potential problems result from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s 
emphasis on presidential, not vice presidential, succession.  If the Vice 
President suffers an inability, current law offers no framework for 
determining that he is disabled.  Further, if the Vice Presidency is vacant, or 
if the Vice President is disabled, the Section 4 procedures used to declare 
the President disabled are unavailable.  Section 4 requires that the “Vice 
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide” must 
declare the President disabled in the event the President does not do so 
himself.150  Succession events occurring absent a functioning Vice 
President could create difficult scenarios, as outlined in Professor Amar’s 
articles and explained below.151 
A.  Vice Presidential Disability Followed by Presidential Death 
In this example, the Vice President is disabled before the President 
dies.152  Under current law, the disabled Vice President would become the 
new President.153  After succession, no statutory or constitutional provision 
provides a mechanism by which to declare the new President disabled if he 
is unable to do so himself.154  Under Section 4, the Vice President and the 
Cabinet, together, trigger the inability determination in the event the 
President fails to do so voluntarily under Section 3.155  After the disabled 
Vice President automatically succeeds to the Presidency under Section 1, it 
is impossible to declare him disabled under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
because there is no Vice President to trigger the Amendment. 
B.  Concurrent Vice Presidential and Presidential Disability 
In this example, the Vice President is comatose, and the President 
becomes disabled, but does not die, as the result of either a terrorist attack 
 
See supra notes 1, 95–97 and accompanying text; infra note 166 and accompanying text; see 
also supra Part IV.A. 
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or natural causes.156  Again, current law requires that, unless the President 
voluntarily steps down under Section 3, the Vice President and the Cabinet 
together determine presidential disability under Section 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.  Therefore, if the Vice President himself is disabled and 
unable to initiate Section 4, the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
“freeze[] up, and there is no clearly established legal framework for 
determining presidential disability.”157 
C.  Disabled President Followed by Disabled Acting President 
Suppose a President becomes disabled and a fit Vice President assumes 
the role of Acting President, under either Section 3 or Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.158  Then, if the Acting President later becomes 
disabled, there is no Vice President in place to initiate the disability 
determination process.159 
D.  Vice Presidential Vacancy Scenarios 
If the Vice President has died and has yet to be replaced under Section 2 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, or if the President has died and the former 
Vice President becomes President but has yet to install a new Vice 
President, there is once again no Vice President in either case to trigger the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment disability determination process in the event the 
President is disabled.160 
E.  A Response 
Professor Amar is certainly correct in his assertion that the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment does not address every conceivable succession contingency.  
However, as previously noted, the drafters of the Amendment declined to 
provide for every such contingency to ensure that the Amendment would 
pass both houses of Congress and proceed to ratification by the necessary 
three-fourths of state legislatures.  It was believed at the time that an 
amendment providing for every possible scenario would be too complex 
and therefore unlikely to survive the difficult congressional and state 
ratification processes and that a perfect solution would probably never be 
found.161 
Professor Amar is also correct in his observation that these continuity 
gaps result mainly from situations in which the nation lacks a functioning 
Vice President.  The Amendment’s drafters understood this problem, and 
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflects the idea that the country 
should have a Vice President at all times.  However, the confirmation 
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process required to fill a vice presidential vacancy takes time, and during 
this process there will inevitably be a period where the office is indeed 
vacant.  For example, Congress took two months to confirm Vice President 
Ford, nominated by President Nixon after the resignation of Vice President 
Agnew.162  Following Nixon’s resignation, Congress took four months to 
confirm President Ford’s vice presidential nominee, Nelson Rockefeller, 
under Section 2 of the Amendment.163 
To shorten the length of any vice presidential vacancy, the ABA 
recommended in 1974 the use of joint hearings by both houses of Congress 
to fill a vacancy under Section 2.164  This recommendation was an attempt 
to ensure that any vacancy in the Vice Presidency would be short lived and 
reflected the ABA’s opinion that it is critical that the nation have a Vice 
President at all times. 
VI.  ADDRESSING THESE GAPS:  A VACANT VICE PRESIDENCY OR 
DISABLED OCCUPANT 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment did no more than (i) address serious 
issues of presidential inability created by the wording and implementation 
of the original succession provision and (ii) add a method for filling a 
vacancy in the Vice Presidency.  The framers of the Amendment 
considered, but ultimately chose not to address, a number of additional 
succession areas—the likes of which continue to be the subject of lively 
debate among distinguished scholars.165  These include such subjects as 
how to determine either a President’s inability in the absence of an able 
Vice President or a Vice President’s inability in general.  As Lewis Powell, 
then President of the ABA, testified before the House Judiciary Committee 
in 1965:  “It is not necessary . . . that we find a solution which is free from 
all reasonable objection.  It is unlikely that such a solution will ever be 
found, as the problems are inherently complex and difficult.”166 
Assuming a vacancy in the Vice Presidency at a time of presidential 
inability, I suggest that the President should not be impeded in turning over 
 
 162. See supra notes 127, 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
 164. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTION REFORM, REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1974) (on file with the Fordham Law 
Review). 
 165. See, e.g., Symposium, The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 
21st Century:  Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional and 
Extraconstitutional Arrangements, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2010) (containing articles by 
William F. Baker, James E. Fleming, Edward Foley, Robert Gilbert, Joel K. Goldstein, and 
Rose McDermott as well the participation of other preeminent scholars like Akhil Reed 
Amar and historical figures such as Senator Birch Bayh, Fred Fielding, and Benton Becker). 
 166. 1965 House Hearing, supra note 91, at 225.  The American Bar Association working 
group did, however, advance in its recommendations that in the event of a vacancy in the 
Vice Presidency, the person next in line of succession should act with the Cabinet in 
considering the inability of a President under Section 4 of the Amendment.  This 
recommendation did not work its way into the Amendment.  As written, the inability 
provisions of the Amendment are not available when there is no Vice President. See supra 
Part IV.A. 
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his powers and duties to the person next in line of succession, since it is 
clear from Article II that such an Officer only serves for the period of the 
inability.  But with a legislative line of succession, it is hard to believe, but 
certainly possible, that a President of one political party would voluntarily 
turn over his powers and duties to a Speaker or President pro tempore of the 
other major party.167  The more troublesome case occurs if the President 
refuses to step aside voluntarily when a substantial issue exists as to his 
inability.  The procedures of Section 4, requiring a Vice President, are not 
available here. 
The question then arises as to the role of the person next in line of 
succession, since the law contemplates his service as Acting President when 
the President is disabled, failing a Vice President.168  It may be argued that 
the person who has the statutory duty to serve as President has the 
discretion to make the decision whether the circumstances justify his 
exercise of the powers of the Office of President.  This officer acts under 
Congress’ Article II power to establish a line of succession for the “Case of 
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice 
President,” until the removal of the disability or the election of a new 
President.169  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment did not change this power, 
except that by establishing a procedure for filling a vacancy in the Vice 
Presidency, it limited the circumstances under which the succession statute 
might be used.170 
The suggestion I advance as to the powers and duties of the potential 
successor is in line with the well-established legal principle concerning 
contingent grants of power.  Indeed, this principle undergirded the adoption 
 
 167. This very issue was the subject of at least two episodes of the television program 
“The West Wing.” See The West Wing:  The Dogs of War (NBC television broadcast Oct. 1, 
2003); The West Wing:  7A WF 83429 (NBC television broadcast Sept. 24, 2003). 
 168. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified 
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)). 
 169. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 170. This subject was part of a telephone conversation I had, as a representative of the 
ABA, with Representative Charles M. Mathias, another member of the House Judiciary 
Committee, on April 9, 1965, concerning the relationship between the Vice Presidential 
Vacancy provision of the Amendment and Congress’s power under Article II, which 
prompted a follow up letter stating as follows: 
  As I indicated, I do not believe that there is any conflict between this provision 
and that part of the succession provision now in the Constitution which gives 
Congress the power to appoint a successor in the case where there is neither a 
President nor Vice-President.  The latter provision would remain intact should the 
Judiciary Committee’s proposal pass the Congress.  Section 2 is operative only 
when there is a vacancy in Vice-President.  The last part of Article II, Section 1, 
clause 6, is operative only when there is a vacancy in both the presidency and vice-
presidency, in which case Congress can declare who shall act as president.  Under 
Section 2 of the proposal such person would have the power to fill the vacancy in 
the vice-presidency.  Since the Committee’s proposal does not deal with 
simultaneous vacancies in the offices of President and Vice-President, there is no 
need to include in the proposal the existing provision which gives Congress the 
power to establish a line of succession. 
Letter from John D. Feerick to Representative Charles Mathias, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Apr. 9, 1965) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
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by three presidential administrations of the four letter agreements between 
Presidents and Vice Presidents discussed earlier.171  Of course, the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment superseded these agreements and limited the discretion of 
the Vice President by requiring concurrence in any disability decision by a 
majority of the Cabinet or “such other body as Congress may by law 
provide.”172  It did not address the role of the person next in the line of 
succession, however. 
Without a Vice President, some of the procedures of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment are unavailable, opening the possibility of using the contingent 
grant of power theory as legal support for allowing the person next in the 
line of succession to declare a President’s disability.  I recognize that if he 
acted alone, he would have a power greater than that of the Vice President 
in similar circumstances, leading to the question of whether Congress might 
be able to restrain that power by requiring consultation with and 
concurrence by the President’s Cabinet, as would have had to be done by 
the Vice President. 
This question involves an analysis of the reach of the Article II power 
given to Congress to declare what Officer shall act as President in a case of 
death, removal, resignation, or inability.  Does Article II enable Congress to 
provide guidance to the successor it designates for service as Acting 
President in an inability situation?  Does the Necessary and Proper Clause 
of Article I, Section 8 offer additional help?  It states that Congress may 
make “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”173  It would be quite compatible with the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment were Congress to legislate that the person next in line of 
succession must seek the concurrence of the Cabinet as well in a 
presidential inability scenario. 
As to the application of the above proposal, how might it deal with an 
issue of double inability?  The same process of allowing the next in line of 
succession to make the vice presidential determination could be appropriate 
as a necessary precondition to the decision of presidential inability in such a 
circumstance.  The presidential successor would be Acting President after 
having resigned another office, as, for instance, the Speakership under the 
1947 law.  While these contingencies may appear remote, nonetheless the 
unforeseeable does occur, as in the 1970s when the country’s two highest 
officers resigned.  These subjects are deserving of thorough examination by 
Congress, as Professor Amar and others have quite appropriately urged.  A 
review of the law supporting the proposals advanced here follows. 
 
 171. See supra Part III.B.5. 
 172. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 173. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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A.  Contingent Grants of Power 
Martin v. Mott174 held that the grantee of a contingent power determines 
whether the contingency has arisen.175  Pursuant to statutory authority, 
President James Madison ordered several of the states to protect against the 
imminent danger of a British invasion during the War of 1812.176  In 
compliance with the President's directive, Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of 
New York ordered militia companies to assemble in New York City.177  
Jacob Mott, a private in one of those companies, refused to obey the order, 
calling into question whether the President had the authority to judge and 
decide the existence of the exigency of an invasion.178 
The Supreme Court unanimously decided “that the authority to decide 
whether the exigency has arisen . . . belongs exclusively to the President, 
and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons,” urging that “this 
construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself, and 
from the manifest object contemplated by the act of Congress.”179  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Joseph Story explained that since the President had 
acted pursuant to a valid exercise of Congress's power, the President—in 
his role as Commander in Chief—had the sole authority to determine 
whether the exigency that necessitated his use of statutory authority actually 
existed.180 
The Court’s holding in Yamataya v. Fisher181 could be analogized to 
support the contention that under the current legal framework, where there 
 
 174. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). 
 175. Id. at 31–32 (“Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be 
exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, 
that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.”). 
 176. Id. at 20.  President Madison acted pursuant to the Enforcement Act of 1795, which 
provided: 
“That whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of 
invasion . . . it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth 
such number of the militia of the state, or states, most convenient to the place of 
danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and 
to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers of the militia, as he 
shall think proper.” 
Id. at 29 (quoting Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424). 
 177. Id. at 20. 
 178. Id. at 20–23, 28–29. 
 179. Id. at 30; see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 
(1928) (“Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the Executive Branch, 
within defined limits, to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting 
discretion in such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the 
details of its execution . . . .”); Prideaux v. Frohmiller, 56 P.2d 628, 631 (Ariz. 1936) 
(“Whether an emergency or contingency exists authorizing the Governor to incur debts 
against the emergency fund under section 2620 is a question of fact, the ascertainment of 
which naturally devolves upon the Governor.  The exercise of his discretion upon the facts 
should not be disturbed by the courts unless for a lack of power or an abuse of discretion.”); 
Scofield v. Perkerson, 46 Ga. 325, 343 (1872) (“Where a duty is imposed upon an officer to 
be performed upon the happening of a contingency, and no mode is pointed out whereby he 
is to be officially informed that the contingency has happened, it necessarily is a part of the 
duty required of him to ascertain the happening of the contingency for himself.”). 
 180. See Martin, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 30–31. 
 181. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
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is a succession event not provided for by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,182 
the next person in line of succession under the 1947 law would be the sole 
judge of disability, and his judgment would not be subject to judicial 
review.183  There, an immigration inspector ordered Yamataya deported 
under an immigration statute providing that aliens who are “paupers or 
persons likely to become a public charge” “shall be excluded from 
admission into the United States.”184  Yamataya contested her deportation 
order, contending she was deprived of her liberty without due process of 
law because she had not been given any notice or opportunity to be heard in 
the proceeding in which her right to liberty was tried.185 
The Court held that decisions of administrative or executive officers 
acting under their delegated powers constituted due process of law and were 
not subject to judicial review, stating where a “statute gives discretionary 
power to an officer . . . he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the 
existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized 
by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of 
the evidence on which he acted.”186 
Recent case law supports the same principles.  Utah Ass’n of Counties v. 
Bush187 concerned the designation of 1.7 million acres of federal land as a 
national monument pursuant to the Antiquities Act of 1906.188  The Act 
gave the President the authority, “‘in his discretion,’ to establish as national 
monuments ‘objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon 
the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States.’”189  
The action against the President alleged that his designations violated the 
Act by not pertaining to “objects of scientific or historic value.”190  The 
Court noted that the plaintiffs sought an interpretation of the Act requiring 
the kind of extensive judicial review long foreclosed by precedent.191  The 
Court cited Martin for the principle that the grantee of a contingent power 
decides when the contingency has arisen, adding that “[a] grant of 
discretion to the President to make particular judgments forecloses judicial 
review of the substance of those judgments altogether.”192 
Article II’s Succession Clause, of course, does not explicitly grant the 
next in line a discretionary power to decide inability.  However, as 
suggested by the case law, a person granted power in certain contingencies 
is implicitly given the discretionary power to decide whether or not the 
contingency has arisen.193  Further, as the 1947 Act mentions no person or 
 
 182. For example, if there is an issue regarding the President’s inability and there is no 
functioning Vice President to initiate Section 4. 
 183. See id. at 98; see also infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 184. Id. at 94–95 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084). 
 185. Id. at 88–89. 
 186. Id. at 98. 
 187. 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Utah 2004). 
 188. Id. at 1176. 
 189. Id. at 1177–78 (quoting Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)). 
 190. Id. at 1185. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. SILVA, supra note 21, at 101; see also supra notes 174–80 and accompanying text. 
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entity, either explicitly or implicitly, other than the successor as holding the 
succession power, then in circumstances where procedures of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment are unavailable, the “officer” designated by law to act as 
President under the 1947 Act is granted the sole discretion to determine 
whether an inability exists. 
B.  The Ability of Congress To Legislate 
The landmark decision of McCulloch v. Maryland194 analyzed the extent 
of Congress’ power under the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper 
Clause.195  There, the Court decided whether Congress had the power to 
charter a bank, and central to this issue was the Court’s interpretation of the 
Clause.196  The Court held that Congress could use the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to create a bank, even though the Constitution did not 
explicitly grant the power to Congress, reasoning that the word “necessary” 
does not refer to the only way of doing something, and does not mean 
“absolutely necessary,” but rather applies to various procedures for 
implementing all constitutionally established powers.197  Chief Justice John 
Marshall further explained, “The clause is placed among the powers of 
Congress, not among the limitations on those powers.”198  Later in Kansas 
v. Colorado,199 the Supreme Court was careful to note that the Clause “is 
not the delegation of a new and independent power, but simply provision 
for making effective the powers theretofore mentioned.”200 
The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to declare what 
officer shall act as President in the event of a double vacancy or double 
disability.201  A federal statute providing for procedures to determine 
disability in the event of a double vacancy arguably would be within the 
scope of the power granted to Congress under this provision.  Such a statute 
would be a necessary and proper means of exercising the power given to 
Congress under Article II to provide a line of succession in the case of a 
double vacancy or disability.  It would not appear to grant a new and 
independent power to Congress, only a measure to ensure the legitimate end 
of providing for a successor beyond the Vice President in circumstances 
where additional process is deemed necessary as an effective use of the 
power. 
 
 194. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 195. Id. at 411–22. 
 196. Id. at 400–01. 
 197. Id. at 421 (“We admit . . . that the powers of the government are limited, and that its 
limits are not to be transcended.  But we think the sound construction of the constitution 
must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the 
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the 
high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.  Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”). 
 198. Id. at 419. 
 199. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
 200. Id. at 88; see also Brownell, Jr., supra note 38, at 206. 
 201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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Further support that Congress may have the ability to legislate beyond 
simply declaring who may act as President in the event of a double vacancy 
or inability can be found in the 1947 succession statute itself.  The current 
succession statute does more than merely state a line of succession beyond 
the Vice President, additionally instructing that:  (i) if a Cabinet member 
becomes Acting President, he only serves until a qualified and prior-entitled 
House Speaker or President pro tempore “bumps” him, becoming the new 
Acting President;202 (ii) either the House Speaker or President pro tempore 
must resign from his respective post before becoming Acting President;203 
(iii) any officers under “impeachment by the House of Representatives at 
the time the powers and duties of the office of the President [would] 
devolve upon them” are ineligible to act as President.204  By providing 
these guidelines, the 1947 Act supports an expansive view of Congress’s 
power in double vacancy scenarios.  Also to be noted is the provision of 
federal law requiring a presidential or vice presidential resignation to be in 
writing and filed with the Secretary of State.205 
VII.  BEYOND THE VICE PRESIDENCY:  LEGISLATIVE OFFICERS IN THE LINE 
OF SUCCESSION AND SPECIAL ELECTIONS 
One of the few certainties regarding the scope of Congress’s power in 
dealing with presidential succession is its ability to provide for cases of a 
double vacancy or inability, “declaring what Officer shall then act as 
President.”206  However, even this seemingly simple provision has not been 
free from controversy. 
The current succession statute provides that the Speaker of the House and 
the President pro tempore of the Senate are in the line of succession 
following the Vice President.207  The designation of these legislative 
officers in the line has come under attack, both from legal and policy 
standpoints. 
In my earlier writings I made suggestions with respect to the line of 
succession, expressing a preference for a Cabinet line, as in the law of 
1886,208 based on these legal and policy considerations.  In addition, I 
proposed that the Cabinet line of succession be extended to include persons 
in widely separated parts of the country, “since all of those persons who are 
presently in the line of succession spend much time in Washington, D.C., 
the whole line could be wiped out in a nuclear attack on that city.”209  
Similarly, I offered reflections with respect to the period extending from the 
conclusion of the nominating conventions to Inauguration Day, believing 
that the existence of political party procedures minimized some of these 
 
 202. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2) (2006). 
 203. Id. § 19(d)(3). 
 204. Id. § 19(e). 
 205. Id. § 20. 
 206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 207. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a), (b). 
 208. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947). 
 209. FEERICK, supra note 23, at 275. 
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threat areas and that Congress had the power to change the date of the 
election.210 
From a legal standpoint, many believe that the present law is 
unconstitutional on several grounds.211  First, there is a serious question as 
to whether the House Speaker and President pro tempore are “Officers” of 
the United States as defined by the Constitution.  Professor Silva argued 
that “the Constitution does not contemplate the presiding legislative officers 
as officers of the United States”, and that this view is “supported by all the 
commentators.”212  Professor Amar writes, “[T]here are compelling reasons 
to think that the current succession statute is itself unconstitutional,” and 
“Congress in 1947 unconstitutionally and unwisely switched away from 
Cabinet succession by putting congressional barons—the Speaker of the 
House and the President pro tempore of the Senate—first in line, ahead of 
the Secretaries of State and Defense.”213  Professor Amar also questions the 
constitutionality of the Act’s “bumping” provision: 
[T]he Act’s bumping provision, Section 19 (d)(2), constitutes an 
independent violation of the Succession Clause, which says that the 
“Officer” named by Congress shall “act as President . . . until the 
[presidential or vice presidential] Disability be removed, or a President 
shall be elected.”  Section 19 (d)(2) instead says, in effect, that the 
successor officer shall act as President until some other suitor wants the 
job.  Bumping weakens the Presidency itself and increases instability and 
uncertainty at the very moment when the nation is most in need of 
tranquility.214 
Additionally, in his article for this publication, Professor Joel K. 
Goldstein discusses in detail an analysis as to whether or not legislative 
officers in the line of succession would be unconstitutional, arguing that 
textual and originalist arguments have proven inconclusive as to this 
question.215 
A serious question undoubtedly exists regarding whether legislative 
leaders are “Officers” as intended by the Constitution.  Still, the 
Constitution is not without its ambiguities in this area.  In analyzing these 
legal considerations it may be helpful to examine the succession provisions 
of the original thirteen colonies and states to understand potentially the 
intentions of the Constitution’s drafters.216 
Colonial provisions, as well as those of early state constitutions, indicate 
that legislative succession was sometimes considered in filling a vacancy in 
the office of the executive.  New York, for example, ran the line of 
 
 210. See id. at 270–75. 
 211. For a detailed discussion of whether the Speaker and President pro tempore are 
“officers” in a constitutional sense, see Amar, supra note 148, at 9, 22–24, 27–29; Ruth C. 
Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 457–75 (1949). 
 212. Silva, supra note 211, at 463–64. 
 213. Amar, supra note 148, at 9. 
 214. Id. at 31. 
 215. Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the 25th Amendment:  Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 1022 (2010). 
 216. FEERICK, supra note 23, at 37. 
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succession first to a lieutenant governor, followed by the President pro 
tempore of the Senate;217 while Delaware and North Carolina’s line of 
succession included the speaker of the lower house.218  These states’ 
succession provisions, drafted not long before the United States 
Constitution, could support an argument that legislative succession was in 
fact within the contemplation and experience of the Constitution’s Framers. 
While the question of whether the Constitution contemplated legislative 
leaders as “Officers” is a difficult one, I would accept these legal risks if I 
thought the policy reasons for excluding legislators from the line of 
succession were not compelling.  First, the experience of House Speakers 
and Presidents pro tempore are almost strictly legislative in nature, and 
these congressional leaders may lack the executive skill required for the 
nation’s chief executive.219  As Professor Bruce A. Ackerman adds, while 
the Speaker of the House is typically a seasoned politician, this is not true 
of the President pro tempore of the Senate, which is “an honorific position 
that, for example, was held by Strom Thurmond into his nineties.”220  The 
central figures in today’s Senate are the majority and minority leaders, but it 
is the President pro tempore, rather than these individuals, who is in the line 
of succession under the current statute.221 
Professor Silva advanced a second policy consideration for removing 
legislative officers from the succession statute, noting that members of 
Congress are elected locally.  Therefore, they are not chosen for their 
knowledge of national issues or their conception of a national vision.222  
Professor Silva argued for an executive line of succession, reasoning that “a 
Cabinet member can better be depended on to continue the policy” of the 
administration and is more likely to lead in “harmony with popular 
government” than a succeeding legislative officer.223 
I believe the principal reason for removing legislative officers from the 
line of succession is to ensure continuity of policy and administration at a 
time of crisis—an objective that cannot be ensured with legislative officers 
in the line.  Our history demonstrates it is by no means remote to have a 
 
 217. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art XXI, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 2623, 2633 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (“[W]henever the government shall 
be administered by the lieutenant-governor, or he shall be unable to attend as president of the 
senate, the senators shall have the power to elect one of their own members to the office of 
president of the senate, which he shall exercise pro hac vice.  And if, during such vacancy of 
the office of governor, the lieutenant-governor shall be impeached, displaced, resign, die, or 
be absent from the State, the president of the senate shall, in like manner as the lieutenant-
governor, administer the government, until others shall be elected by the suffrage of the 
people, at the succeeding election.”). 
 218. FEERICK, supra note 23, at 37–38.  For a more detailed discussion on succession 
provisions in the colonies and early state constitutions, see chapter three of id. 
 219. Id. at 266. 
 220. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK:  PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN 
AGE OF TERRORISM 157 (2006). 
 221. Id. 
 222. SILVA, supra note 21, at 158. 
 223. Id. 
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President and Vice President of one party and a Congress dominated by 
another.224  As Professor Goldstein points out, “Since 1969, the President 
and Speaker of the House have come from opposite parties [in] twenty-
eight of the forty-two years.”225  A quick shift in party control in the event 
of a double vacancy will not provide the necessary stability in what would, 
in all likelihood, be a time of crisis, if not trauma.  Appointed Cabinet 
members are more likely to see eye to eye with the President on issues of 
national policy, and therefore Cabinet succession will better maintain policy 
continuity should an emergency arise creating the need for succession 
beyond the Vice President. 
The Continuity of Government Commission advanced proposals for 
succession beyond the Vice Presidency in a recent report.226  The 
Commission made the following recommendations: 
A reordering of the Presidential line of succession to:  Vice President, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, 
Attorney General, followed by four or five newly appointed individuals 
residing outside of Washington, D.C.   A dual vacancy in the presidency 
and vice presidency during the first two years of a term should trigger a 
special election within five months.  The winner of the election would 
serve the remainder of the term and would displace the temporary 
successor.227 
 Additionally, the Commission suggested “removing Congressional 
leaders and acting secretaries from the line . . . to limit confusion over who 
can assume power.”228  The report also proposed “reducing the time 
between the casting and counting of electoral votes” and clarification by 
Congress of “procedures for incapacitation and . . . guidelines for continuity 
in the event of an attack at the presidential inauguration or during the time 
period before the inauguration.”229  It added:  “If possible, the outgoing 
president should appoint some or all of the incoming president’s cabinet 
nominees prior to the inauguration to ensure individuals will remain in the 
line of succession.”230 
Two aspects of these proposals on which I have written and offered 
views relate to the Electoral College system, whose abolition I favor,231 and 
a special election for a new President and Vice President in the event of a 
double vacancy, which I do not favor. 
 
 224. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 23, app. E (listing numerous occasions during which 
either the Speaker of the House of Representatives or President pro tempore of the Senate, or 
both, were from a different party than the President).  Most recently, Democratic Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi served under Republican President George W. Bush. 
 225. Goldstein, supra note 215, at [+65]. 
 226. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS:  THE CONTINUITY 
OF THE PRESIDENCY (Second Report 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
~/media/Files/rc/reports/2009/06_continuity_of_government/06_continuity_of_government.
pdf. 
 227. Id. at 68. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. For a detailed discussion of the electoral college, see Feerick, supra note 148. 
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A special election in the event of a double vacancy was part of the 1792 
Succession Law,232 and words to permit it were included in the law of 
1886.233  As I have written previously, “It seems to have been assumed 
during the debates that if there were such an election, the new President 
would have to serve for a full four-year term on the theory that this is the 
only term referred to in the Constitution for a President.”234 
The subject of a special election was considered but rejected in the 
debates leading to the adoption of the 1947 succession statute.  In 
particular, one of the main architects of the law expressed “strong 
reservations about the constitutionality of a special election law.”235  The 
resignations of President Nixon and Vice President Agnew led to a flurry of 
proposals for a special election in the event of a double vacancy or a single 
vacancy in the office of Vice President.236  These proposals were 
considered in the review of the first implementations of Section 2 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.237  The congressional review at the time found 
that the Amendment, in providing for a replacement Vice President, had 
functioned well in the most difficult of circumstances.238  The best feature 
of Section 2, in my opinion, is its assurance of stability and continuity in 
what otherwise might be a double vacancy were the Vice Presidency left 
vacant after the death, resignation, or removal of a President or of a Vice 
President. 
Turning to the viability of a special election in the event of double 
vacancies in the offices of President and Vice President, it is an interesting 
idea clouded by uncertainty and controversy.  The practice would raise 
serious questions after simultaneous vacancies regarding the legitimacy of 
such a means of transferring presidential power.  One issue involves the 
nature of the specially-elected President and Vice President’s term.  While 
the Constitution only provides for a four-year term for an elected President 
and Vice President commencing January 20, it is not entirely free from 
doubt whether a special election would be for four years or for the duration 
of the existing term, which was the basis of the proposal made and rejected 
in 1947.  While there is appeal to the notion of a special election in the 
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event of a double vacancy, I suggest that succession stability is better 
served by the present system.239 
Finally, I note that I supervised a special clinical seminar on presidential 
succession at the Fordham University School of Law in the fall of 2010, 
along with my esteemed colleagues Dora Galacatos and Nicole Gordon.  
The students in the seminar advanced proposals to fill gaps or make 
improvements in the current scheme for presidential succession.  
Recognizing the practical difficulties of removing legislative officers 
entirely from the line of succession, the students studied whether there 
should be a different line of succession only in the case of temporary 
presidential inability (and the Office of the Vice President is vacant), 
preserving the current line of succession for filling vacancies caused by 
death, resignation, or removal.  The students also noted the difficulties, 
practical and otherwise, of having governors, ambassadors, or former 
presidents in the line of succession.  They considered whether keeping 
acting secretaries in the line of succession gives the country greater 
protection, from a rule of law perspective, by including these fifteen 
individuals in an extended line in case of mass tragedy.  Among other 
topics, they also explored the practical alternatives available to the 
Executive Branch in the absence of legislation to correct existing gaps. 
CONCLUSION 
The ambiguities of the Succession Clause have created complex 
questions during difficult moments in the nation’s history.  The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment has been successful in answering many of these 
uncertainties.  It is now clear that in cases of removal, resignation, or death 
of the President, the Vice President succeeds to the Office of the Presidency 
for the remainder of the term.  In cases of inability, the Vice President does 
not succeed to the Office of the Presidency, but rather acts as President for 
the duration of the President’s inability.  When there is a functioning Vice 
President in place, the Amendment answers with certainty the question of 
who is to determine when presidential inability exists and establishes 
procedures for doing so.  Further, the Amendment requires the President to 
fill a vice presidential vacancy in the event one arises, creating further 
stability in the presidential succession process by helping to ensure that a 
Vice President will be in place to initiate Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Amendment should the need surface. 
The Amendment, however, does not address and provide for every 
conceivable succession scenario, as was understood at the time of its 
adoption.  In particular, in situations where the Vice Presidency is vacant 
(or the Vice President is disabled) and the President is disabled but has not 
declared himself to be under Section 3, what happens is not entirely clear. 
I agree with a number of well-known scholars that the person granted 
certain powers should an emergency arise is the one to decide whether or 
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not the emergency has arisen.  Therefore, the Speaker of the House would 
be the person to make the disability determination in the event no Vice 
President could do so.  However, there is no current law in place to provide 
procedures and safeguards to ensure that the Speaker (or next in line) does 
not abuse this power (such as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s requirement 
that the Vice President has supporting opinion from a majority of the 
Cabinet).  I believe a good case can be made that Congress has the power to 
create such a law. 
Prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Congress probably had no power 
to legislate on presidential inability so long as there was a functioning Vice 
President in place.  The Amendment now makes clear the procedure for 
determining inability when there is a functioning Vice President.  However, 
Congress may have lawmaking power in the event of a double vacancy or 
double disability.  If so, Congress should consider legislation establishing 
procedures for assisting the person next in line to reach a determination of a 
President’s inability.  Any statute should provide safeguards to promote 
public confidence and to ensure that the next in line does not abuse his 
power in declaring a presidential disability, such as a requirement that a 
majority of the Cabinet (or other body provided for by Congress by law) 
agree with the next in line’s assessment.  Further, any future statutes 
dealing with succession should consider the constitutional issues and 
potential policy consequences of including legislative officers in the line of 
succession.  Finally, while a special election in the event of a double 
vacancy raises appealing prospects, such an election would be clouded by 
difficult questions, both from legal and policy standpoints. 
 
